FTC review of Boeing / McDonnell Douglas

McDonnell Douglas once competed with Boeing on MD-80 and MD-11 jets, but orders collapsed by the 1990s.

Boeing sought the merger for defense business and manufacturing consolidation as much as commercial rivalry elimination.

Antitrust agencies globally focused on whether Boeing would gain unfair insight into airlines' Airbus purchases via McDonnell Douglas records.

Behavioral remedies cleared the path; critics later argued the merger still reduced potential future competition in an already concentrated industry.

Airline manufacturing concentration affects ticket prices indirectly through plane supply and innovation.

Shows regulators approving '2-to-1.5' style mergers with behavioral fixes instead of blocks.

Historical contrast to blocked or challenged airline mergers in passenger service markets.

Merger could lessen competition in commercial aircraft markets.

Combined customer data might facilitate anticompetitive pricing or product strategies.

Military overlaps required oversight separately from commercial jets.

Boeing said McDonnell Douglas was exiting commercial jets anyway.

Efficiencies in production and R&D would benefit airlines and the Pentagon.

Global competition from Airbus remained vigorous.

When you fly, your plane is likely Boeing or Airbus partly because of 1990s consolidation.

Behavioral remedies tried to preserve competition without stopping the deal.

Later Boeing crises (737 MAX) renewed debate on industrial concentration—not antitrust reversals.